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INTRODUCTION
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act' (ADA or Act)
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of disability,2
and requires employers to provide reasonable accommodation to
disabled applicants and employees who desire to work.3 One
way - often the only way - an employer can accommodate an
employee is to reassign that employee to a position which the
employee is capable of performing.4 Often, however, collective
bargaining agreements, by imposing seniority requirements on
certain job classifications, such as light-duty work, limit an
employer's ability to reassign an employee to such a position.5
The ADA thus puts the employer in a "Catch-22" situation: if
the employer reassigns the employee, the employer will violate
the collective bargaining agreement; if the employer does not,
the employer may violate the ADA. This article discusses how
courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) have resolved and should resolve this dilemma.
This particular conflict between workers' collective rights,
embodied in collective bargaining agreements, and workers'
individual rights, created by external laws such as the ADA,
arises within a debate on how law can best protect workers.
American labor law is currently at a crossroad.6 For the last
fifty years, American labor law has relied on the industrial
pluralist vision embodied in the National Labor Relations Act7
(NLRA) for guidance. Industrial pluralism, an ideology of social
interaction between employers and employees, eschews outside
interference and instead envisions workers sufficiently empow-
' Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. II 1990)).
2 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 1992).
3 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1991).
4 See, e.g., Konieczko v. United States Postal Serv., 47 M.S.P.R. 509 (1991)
(for discussion, see infra notes 123-133 and accompanying text) (post office
fired plaintiff letter carrier because a leg injury rendered the plaintiff "unfit
for duty"; plaintiff could, however, have performed light-duty window clerk
work).
' Id. (collective bargaining agreement gave preference for window clerk
positions by seniority).
' Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law As the Century Turns: A Changing of the
Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7 (1988).
7 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1982).
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ered to look after themselves.' The NLRA, following this mod-
el, establishes a framework through which employees can
organize to acquire the bargaining power necessary to signifi-
cantly influence wages, working conditions, and other terms and
conditions of employment.9 Thus defined, workplace relations
are analogous to miniature political democracies: 0 employers
and employees, rough equals," jointly negotiate and enforce"
an agreement which establishes the conditions of
employment."s The NLRA confers no substantive employment
rights; 4 rather, it establishes the framework through which
employees may negotiate their own. 5 The process of collective
bargaining gives employees a voice in decisions that significant-
ly influence their lives, freeing them from the "dictatorships"
established by the "lords of industry."'6
'Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV.
L. REV. 999, 1007 (1955) (arguing that the collective bargaining process and
the grievance procedures created therein constitute an "autonomous rule of
law").
' Id. at 1000 (explaining that the NLRA established a "bare legal frame-
work [that] is hardly an encroachment on the premise that wages and other
conditions of employment be left to autonomous determination by employers
and labor.").
'0 Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 274, 276 (1948).
" JOHN ROGERS AND JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLEs OF LABOR LEGISLA-
TION 43 (4th rev. ed. 1936).
1 David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment, 61 CAL. L. REV. 663, 742 (1973) ("the enforcement mechanism, then, is
the essence of the industrial collective bargaining agreement.").
13 CLINTON S. GOLDEN AND HAROLD J. RUrTENBERG, THE DYNAMICS OF
INDuSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 23 (1942).
14 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor
Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1511 (1981); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343
U.S. 395,402 (1952) ("The [NLRA] does not compel any agreement whatsoever
between employees and employers. Nor does the Act regulate the substantive
terms governing wages, hours and working conditions which are incorporated
in an agreement.").
15 Shulman, supra note 8, at 1005 (stating that a collective bargaining
agreement, together with the grievance procedure created therein, creates a
private rule of law which eliminates or reduces employer discretion).
" See William M. Leiserson, Constitutional Government in American
Industries, 12 AM. ECON. REv. 56, 66 (Supp. 12 1922); GOLDEN &
RUIENBERG, supra note 13, at chapter II.
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An alternative vision for ordering the American workplace
is the individual rights model. This model focuses, not on the
collective power of workers to protect themselves, but on legis-
lative and judicial rules protecting workers through the impo-
sition of universal work rules."7 The individual rights model is
epitomized by such statutes as Title VII,"5 the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act,"9 and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act.
Many commentators see these two models as mutually
exclusive. Such theorists see the statutory creation of individ-
ual employment rights as both signaling and causing the demise
of the industrial pluralist model of collective bargaining." The
purpose of this article is to examine in detail one instance in
which the two models come head-to-head and one model must
be chosen over the other: whether the ADA provides disabled
employees an individual right to job reassignment despite
contrary provisions in a collective bargaining agreement.2
17 See generally Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based
Workplace, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 169 (1991).
18 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
19 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
21 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism:
The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal
Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575 (1992) (arguing that the
broad § 301 preemption doctrine has caused unions to decline in number and
political power by hindering unionized workers' ability to implement their
contractual rights and depriving them of individual employment rights under
external law); Summers, supra note 6, at 10-11 (arguing that because labor
unions have proven to be an ineffective regulator of the labor market, individ-
ual rights laws are in the process of supplanting the NLRA as the chief
guarantor of worker protection); Rabin, supra note 17, at 171 (explaining, but
not endorsing, the view that the creation of individual employment rights is
the cause of the decline of collective bargaining). For the general view that
industrial pluralism and individual rights are mutually exclusive, see GOLDEN
& RUTTENBERG, supra note 13, at 23. Golden & Ruttenberg, as well as most
early advocates of industrial pluralism, believed that the collective bargaining
process would adequately protect whatever rights workers felt warranted
negotiation; the essentially democratic nature of union representation would
ensure that workers' voices were adequately represented at the bargaining
table. See, e.g., GOLDEN & RuTrENBERG, supra note 13, at 43; Leiserson,
supra note 16, at 75.
" The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has thus far
declined to provide any guidance for such conflicts and appears itself torn
between longstanding industrial pluralist labor policy, giving priority to
collective bargaining, on the one hand, and to the apparent congressional
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Part I of this Article discusses Title VII and the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act),22 two statutes which
preceded the ADA and which provide guidance for interpreting
ADA language. Part II analyzes in detail the provisions and
requirements of the ADA and discusses the meaning of key
phrases such as "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hard-
ship." Parts III and IV examine two conflicts between collective
bargaining and the ADA. Part III describes the Act's prohibi-
tion of discrimination through contractual relations which, inter
alia, may make employers liable for the discriminatory behavior
of union hiring halls. Part IV discusses whether a collective
bargaining agreement is a defense to an employer's duty to
provide reasonable accommodation to a disabled applicant or
employee. The Summary and Conclusion, which ties together
Parts III and IV, draws three conclusions. First, the distinction
between the discriminatory use of a contractual relationship,
which the ADA outlaws, and the use of a collective bargaining
agreement as a defense to reasonable accommodation, which the
ADA permits, is unclear. Second, neither the legislative history
of the ADA nor the case histories of the Rehabilitation Act and
Title VII provide any significant guidance toward resolving
conflicts between the individual employment rights created by
the ADA and the collective rights created by collective bar-
gaining agreements. Third, courts should interpret the ADA to
impose upon employers a duty to provide reasonable accom-
modation to disabled employees by reassigning them when
necessary to different positions, even if such reassignment
contravenes a collective bargaining agreement.
grant of individual employee rights on the other. See 29 C.F.R. app. pt. 1630
(1992):
The divergent views expressed in the public comments demonstrate
the complexity of employment-related issues concerning... collec-
tive bargaining agreement matters. These highly complex issues
require extensive research and analysis and warrant further
consideration. Accordingly, the Commission [EEOC] has decided to
address the issues in depth in future Compliance Manual sections
and policy guidances.
The EEOC has yet to release any such guidance.
' Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 357, § 2,
reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.ALN. 409, 410 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 701-794 (1988)).
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I. PREDECESSOR STATUTES TO THE ADA
By passing the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress
acknowledged that existing antidiscrimination statutes, such as
Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, were inadequate to
protect the rights of disabled Americans.' Discussing these
two statutes, however, is useful because some of the language of
the ADA mirrors that of the Rehabilitation Act. Both Title VII
and the Rehabilitation Act will provide guidance in interpreting
the ADA.
A. TITLE VII
Title VII prohibitions against employment discrimination do
not extend to discrimination based on disability.2 4 Several
attempts were made in the late 1970s and early 1980s to amend
Title VII to include the disabled.2" However, civil rights
groups opposed reform of Title VII, fearing that opening up the
statute to substantive amendments meant risking the efficacy of
the statute's civil rights guarantees. 6 Further, commentators
pointed to fundamental differences between the needs of the
disabled and the traditional recipients of Title VII protection.
First, Title VII does not offer effective remedies against
disability discrimination. For example, the prohibition on
disparate treatment merely requires the use of employment
23 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, 12101(a)(7) (Supp. II 1991) (finding that individuals
with disabilities "have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected
to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of
political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond
the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in,
and contribute to, society.").
' Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or
national origin.
' See, e.g., H.R. 370, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. REP. No. 316, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 1200, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
2 Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis
and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 429 (1991); see also Ellen Saideman, Title I of the ADA
from a Historical Perspective, Address at the Cornell Journal of Law and
Public Policy Symposium "Enabling the Workplace" (March 28, 1992) (video-
tape on file with Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy).
21 See, e.g., UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIViL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE
SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 142-146 (1983).
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criteria that are not tainted with bias.2 8  Remedies such as
individualized reasonable accommodation and removal of archi-
tectural, transportation, and communication barriers are not
available under traditional Title VII analysis. 9 Second, dis-
ability may create a difference in the ability of an employee to
perform a given job, ° particularly if the employer is not under
a duty to provide reasonable accommodation to the employee.
Title VII standards are likely to be useless to the disabled
individual because employment criteria which have a disparate
impact are quite likely to meet the business necessity3 ' excep-
tion allowed under Title VII.
3 2
B. SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT
Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 19733 to pro-
vide vocational rehabilitation for the handicapped.3 4 Section
504 was intended to prevent discrimination against handicapped
individuals by affording them equal opportunities in federally
funded programs.3 Originally an "inconspicuous part" of the
Rehabilitation Act, 6 section 504 became significant several
See Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Note, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The
Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1429 (1991).
' See Burgdorf, supra note 26, at 430 n.92; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE
HANDICAPPED, TOwARD INDEPENDENCE A-35 to A-39 (1986).
' See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 298 (1985) ("[T]he handicapped
typically are not similarly situated to the nonhandicapped .... ).
' See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (permitting the use
of facially neutral criteria that have a disparate impact on a protected class if
those criteria constitute a "business necessity").
32 Cooper, supra note 28, at 1429.
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 357, § 2,
reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 409, 410 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 701-794 (1988)).
' See 119 Cong. ec. 24, 571 (1973).
3 S. REP. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6388. For this reason, a disproportionately large number
of Rehabilitation Act cases are public sector cases, mostly brought by employ-
ees of the United States Postal Service. That Rehabilitation Act defendants
are often public sector employers, however, does not distinguish such cases
from those in which the defendant is a private sector employer.
36 RICHARD M. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO Cvi RIGHTs 1 (1984), cited
in Julie Brandfield, Note, Undue Hardship: Title I of the Americans with
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years after its enactment, when the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) empowered the Office of Civil
Rights to draft implementing regulations for the Rehabilitation
Act.
3 7
A section 504 plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that the plaintiff was (1) an indi-
vidual with a handicap within the meaning of the Rehabilitation
Act; (2) qualified for the job but for a handicap; (3) denied a job,
promotion, or raise for which the plaintiff applied; and (4)
excluded solely because of a handicap."8 Once the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer
to show either that the plaintiff was not otherwise qualified, 9
or that any possible accommodation would cause the employer
undue hardship.4" Finally, the plaintiff has the opportunity to
rebut the employer's contention of undue hardship by showing
that the proposed accommodation is, in fact, reasonable.4
Thus, an employer need not accommodate a handicapped
individual if the individual is not otherwise qualified for the job
or if the accommodation in question would impose upon the
employer an undue hardship. HEW regulations specify three
factors which courts are to consider in determining whether an
accommodation imposes an undue hardship:
(1) The overall size of the recipient's program with
respect to number of employees, number and type of
facilities, and size of budget;
(2) The type of the recipient's operation, including the
composition and structure of the recipient's workforce;
and
Disabilities Act, 59 FoRDHAM L. REV. 113, 116 n.25 (1990).
" Id. The regulations were finally implemented in 1978. SCOTCH, supra
note 36, at 80.
' See Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 309-10 (5th
Cir. 1981); Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1989); Gardner v.
Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1280 (8th Cir. 1985); Copeland v. Philadelphia Police
Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1148 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989).
" Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979)
(holding that an otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a
program's requirements in spite of his handicap).
"' Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d at 397-8.
41 Id.; see also Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d at 310.
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(3) The nature and cost of the accommodation need-
ed.42
The factors specified by the HEW regulations, however,
provide little indication of precisely when a hardship becomes
"undue."4 One commentator has labeled them an "ambiguous
list of unweighted characteristics,""4 which, as another com-
mentator has noted, gives courts the freedom to create widely
varying pictures of undue hardship.4" Courts have done just
that.46 Each case turns on its own facts,4 7 and courts appar-
ently label as an "undue hardship" any accommodation that
they have already decided not to impose on an employer.48
II. THE ADA
A. PROVISIONS
Congress in 1990 promulgated the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act to rectify the status of disabled Americans.49 One
of the initial hurdles in drafting such legislation was to define
whom the Act would cover.
1. Who Is Protected
The term "disability" means, with respect to an
42 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1992).
41 See Brandfield, supra note 36, at 118.
William G. Johnson, The Rehabilitation Act and Discrimination Against
Handicapped Workers: Does the Cure Fit the Disease?, in DISABILITY AND THE
LABOR MARKET 242, 260 (Monroe Berkowitz and M. Anne Hill eds. 1986).
4
' Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 997, 1002-03 (1984).
" See Steven William Gerse, Note, Mending the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 713, 717 (1982).
47 See Gregory S. Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating "Undue Hard-
ship" Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L.J. 13
(1990).
41 See Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped, supra
note 45, at 1011.
49 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (Supp. II 1991).
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individual:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major
life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment."0
The first category in the ADA's definition of disability
includes physiological disorders, cosmetic disfigurement, and
mental or psychological disorders,5 and is to be determined
without regard to mitigating factors such as medicines or
assistive or prosthetic devices." The purpose of the second
category of the definition - a record of such an impairment -
is to ensure that people are not discriminated against because
of a history of disability.5" The third category of the definition
- being regarded as having such an impairment - is designed
to protect an individual discriminated against because of the
"myths, fears, and stereotypes" associated with a disability.54
2. Scope of Coverage
The broad coverage of the ADA far surpasses the limited
scope of the Rehabilitation Act.5" When fully implemented, the
antidiscrimination provisions of the ADA will extend to employ-
ment,56 public services," public transportation," public accom-
50 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. II 1991).
51 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)-(2) (1992).
52 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1992). Physical characteristics, such as
left-handedness are not covered; nor are environmental, cultural, or economic
disadvantages such as poverty, lack of education, or a prison record. Id.
Major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, perform-
ing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1992).
13 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k) (1992). For example, former cancer patients
may not be discriminated against on the basis of their prior medical history.
This provision also protects persons who have been misclassified as disabled,
e.g. as having a learning disability. Id.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(1) (1992).
5 See Burgdorf, supra note 26, at 453.
56 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Supp. II 1991). The regulations thus adopt
the finding of the United States Supreme Court in the section 504 case of
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), in which the
TITLE I OF THE ADA
modations and commercial facilities,59  and telecom-
munication."
3. Employment
The ADA's general rule against employment discrimination
states that:
No covered entity[61] shall discriminate against a qual-
ified individual with a disability because of the disabili-
ty of such individual in regard to job application proce-
dures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employ-
ees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.62
To aid interpretation, the ADA provides several rules of
construction, explaining that discrimination by a covered entity
includes: (1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant
or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or
status of the applicant or employee; (2) participating in a con-
tractual or other arrangement that has the effect of subjecting
a covered entity's applicant or employee to discrimination; (3)
using standards, criteria, or methods of administration that
either have a negatively disparate impact on the disabled or
that perpetuate the discrimination of others; (4) excluding or
otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individu-
al because of the known disability of an individual with whom
the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or
association; (5)(A) not making reasonable accommodation to the
known limitations of an otherwise qualified individual, unless
doing so would impose an undue hardship on the covered entity;
Court stated that "society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and
diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from
actual impairment." Id. at 284.
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (Supp. II 1991).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12165 (Supp. 1 1991).
59 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (Supp. II 1991).
47 U.S.C. § 225(c) (Supp. II 1991).
"' The ADA defines "covered entity" to include an "employer, employment
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(2) (Supp. H 1991).
62 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. 1 1991).
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(5)(B) denying employment opportunities to an otherwise quali-
fied individual on the basis of the need to provide reasonable
accommodation to that individual; (6) using qualification
standards, employment tests, or other selection criteria that
tend to screen out either a disabled individual or a class of
disabled individuals, unless such standards, tests, or criteria are
job-related and consistent with business necessity; and (7)
selecting and administering tests that discriminate against
individuals with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills,
unless such skills are the factors that the test purports to
measure, in which case the employer must show that the skills
are job-related and consistent with business necessity."
Title I attempts to improve the status of disabled Americans
and provide them with a "meaningful equal employment oppor-
tunity";' i.e., an opportunity to attain the same level of perfor-
mance available to able-bodied people.65 This part of this
article examines in greater detail the duty imposed by the Act
on employers and the exceptions afforded by the Act.
B. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
As noted above, Title I of the ADA defines discrimination by
employers as "not making reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability."66 This definition imposes a duty
on employers to provide reasonable accommodation to applicants
and employees.
The EEOC Regulations to Title I delineate three areas
where employers must make reasonable accommodation.67
6 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (Supp. II 1991).
H. R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 66 (1990).
6 Id.
r 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1991).
' "Reasonable accommodation" is a term of art in the context of Title VII
religious discrimination. In Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977), the United States Supreme Court held that the undue hardship
limitation of EEOC regulations does not require employers to "reasonably
accommodate" workers' religious beliefs if the proposed accommodation
imposes more than a de minimis cost. However, such an interpretation of
"reasonable accommodation" is inappropriate in ADA cases. The report of the
House Commission on Education and Labor expressly rejects application of the
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First, an employer must modify or adjust the job application
process to allow an otherwise qualified disabled applicant to be
considered for the position. Second, the employer must modify
or adjust the work environment, or the manner in which the job
is customarily performed, to enable a qualified individual with
a disability to perform the essential functions of that
position.68 Third, the employer must make modifications or
adjustments to enable disabled employees to enjoy equal bene-
fits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by able-bodied
employees.69
C. EXCEPTIONS TO AN EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO PROVIDE
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
The ADA provides four circumstances in which an employer
need not reasonably accommodate an applicant or employee.
First, an employer does not have to provide an accommodation
that would impose an undue hardship on the employer or the
operation of the business."0 Second, an employer need not
provide an accommodation to an employee otherwise unqualified
for the job.71 Third, an employer does not have to accommo-
de minimis approach to reasonable accommodation to the ADA:
The Committee wishes to make it clear that the principles enunciat-
ed by the Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison, U.S. 63 (1977) [sic]
are not applicable to this legislation .... [U]nder the ADA, reason-
able accommodations must be provided unless they rise to the level
of "requiring significant difficulty or expense" on the part of the
employer, in light of the factors noted in the statute-i.e., a signifi-
cantly higher standard than that articulated in Hardison.
H. R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 68 (1990).
' The ADA imposes a duty on employers to modify both the work environ-
ment and the job itself. Examples of altering the environment include making
the workplace, break rooms, restrooms, training rooms, and employer-provided
transportation accessible to disabled employees and applicants. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o) (1992). Examples of altering the job itself include altering when or
how the function is performed, reallocating marginal job functions, and
reassigning the disabled employee to another position. The ADA does not
require employers to reallocate essential job functions, and the reassignment
option is strictly limited to avoid segregation or discrimination. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o) (1992); H. R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 64
(1990).
69 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii) (1992).
70 See infra part II.C.1.
71 See infra part II.C.2.
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date an individual who, even with the accommodation, would be
unable to perform the essential functions of the job. 2 Fourth,
an employer need not accommodate an employee if the employ-
ee, or if the accommodation itself, would pose a direct threat to
the health or safety of other individuals.73
1. Undue Hardship
Title I of the ADA imposes no duty to accommodate where
the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation "would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the [employer's]
business. '7 4  "Undue hardship" refers to the effects of any
accommodation that would be unduly costly, extensive, sub-
stantial, disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the
nature or operation of the business.75
As with the undue hardship exception to section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, determining precisely when a hardship
becomes "undue" is difficult. Congress rejected several pro-
posals that would have made this determination significantly
easier. The original version of the Act stated that an accom-
modation would be reasonable unless it threatened the contin-
ued existence of the employer's business.76  Confronted by
strident opposition by business interests,77 Congress retreated
and adopted the present balancing approach. Congress subse-
quently rejected an amendment that would have imposed a
ceiling of ten percent of the employee's annual salary as the
upper limit for what an employer must spend to reasonably
accommodate the employee.73  Instead of promulgating a
bright-line test, Congress decreed that each case shall turn on
its own facts.79
The undue hardship test is composed of six factors. Con-
gress, in the text of the Act, established the first four. The
See infra part II.C.3.
7 See infra part II.C.4.
14 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A) (Supp. II 1991).
7' 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p) (1992).
" See Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans With Disabilities Act: An Over-
view, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 923, 927.
77 Id.
78 136 CoNG. REC. H2471, H2475 (daily ed. May 17, 1990).
79 See H. R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 70 (1990).
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EEOC, in the regulations to the Act, added the fifth. The Act's
legislative history indicates the sixth.
First, courts must consider the nature and cost of the
accommodation.80 Second, courts must examine the financial
resources of the local facility." Third, courts must consider
the financial resources of the covered entity as a whole. For
example,
[A] small day-care center might not be required to
expend more than a nominal sum, such as that neces-
sary to equip a telephone for use by a secretary with
impaired hearing, but a large school district might be
required to make available a teacher's aide to a blind
applicant for a teaching job.82
Courts must also consider the geographic separateness and
administrative or fiscal relationship between the entity and its
facility or facilities. This does not appear to be an independent
factor, but rather an amalgam of the two previous factors,
relevant when determining whether the court should focus more
on the financial resources of the particular facility (factor two)
or on the financial resources of the covered entity as a whole
(factor three). For example, if the financial relationship be-
tween a franchisor and an independently owned and operated
franchisee is limited to payment of an annual franchise fee, only
the financial resources of the franchisee would be considered in
determining whether or not providing the accommodation would
constitute an undue hardship."
Fourth, courts must examine the types of operations con-
ducted by the covered entity.
EEOC regulations add a fifth factor to the undue hardship
test: the effect of the proposed accommodation on the operation
of the facility, including the effect on the ability of other employ-
ees to work and on the employer's ability to conduct business on
"0 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(i) (Supp. H 1991).
8" 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(ii) (Supp. II 1991); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p)
("[Consideration of the financial resources of the employer or other covered
entity as a whole may be inappropriate because it may not give an accurate
picture of the financial resources available to the particular facility that will
be actually required to provide the accommodation.").
82 H. R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 67 (1990).
s' 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p)(2)(ii) (1992).
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the premises.8 4 For example, it may be an undue hardship to
maintain wheelchair accessibility at a construction worksite
where the site's terrain and building structure change daily. 5
The legislative history of the ADA suggests a sixth factor:
the number of applicants or employees86 that will potentially
benefit from the accommodation." For example, a ramp in-
stalled for a new employee with a wheelchair will also benefit
future mobility-impaired applicants and employees.8
The undue hardship provision applies just as it does cur-
rently under section 504,89 which, as noted above,9 ° provides
no constructive guidance. Congress has thus imposed a ceiling
of bankruptcy"' and a floor of de minimis,92 but between these
two extremes has left courts with broad discretion and a man-
date to proceed on a case-by-case basis.9"
2. Otherwise Qualified
An employer need not accommodate a disabled applicant or
employee who, even absent the disability, is unqualified for the
job.94 EEOC regulations define a qualified individual as one
who "satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and
other job-related requirements of the employment position such
individual holds or desires ... .," If a law firm requires all
incoming lawyers to have graduated from an accredited law
school and to have passed the bar examination, the firm need
not accommodate a disabled individual who has not met these
8 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) (1992).
H. R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 69-70 (1990).
86 Customers are not mentioned, but I see no logical reason why they
should be excluded from consideration under this factor.
87 H. R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 69 (1990).
88 Id.
89 H. R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 67, 70 (1990).
9o See supra text accompanying notes 43-48.
91 See supra text accompanying note 76.
92 See supra note 67.
93 See supra text accompanying note 79.
" The general rule against discrimination states that "No covered entity
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability ......
[emphasis added]. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 1991).
9' 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1992).
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selection criteria; such an individual is not otherwise qualified
for the position.96
A harder case arises, however, when an employer claims
that an applicant or employee is not otherwise qualified for the
position because the applicant cannot, even with reasonable
accommodation, perform the "essential functions" of the posi-
tion. This scenario is discussed in the next section.
3. Essential Functions
The ADA does not require an employer to accommodate an
applicant or employee unless that accommodation will enable
the applicant or employee to perform the essential functions of
the position.97 Congress based the "essential functions" re-
quirement on two considerations. Congress did not want to
force employers to hire employees who could not perform the
job.9" However, neither did Congress wish to give employers
the opportunity to define the job so as to exclude applicants
merely because of their inability to perform purely peripheral
tasks.99 Congress compromised by stating that courts must
consider the employer's definition of essential job functions, but
that the definition is neither conclusive nor presumptive.0 0
The EEOC subsequently issued a non-exclusive,
non-conclusive list of factors for determining whether a partic-
ular function is essential.' A court must consider (i) the
9 H. R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 65 (1990); 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.2(m) (1992).
9' The Act defines a "qualified individual with a disability" (i.e., one
covered by Title I of the Act) as "an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position .... ." [emphasis added]. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. II
1991). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (1992) (reasonable accommodation
includes "modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the
manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is custom-
arily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform
the essential functions of the position." [emphasis added]). For application of
the "essential functions" requirement under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, see School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987).
98 See H. R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 55-56 (1990).
' See generally id. at 55 (citing a drivers' license requirement for ajob that
does not involve driving as an example of an overly-exclusionary policy).
100 See H. R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 3, at 33 (1990);
Cooper, supra note 28, at 1442-43.
" E.g., if an employer wants to hire someone to proofread documents, the
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employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii)
written job descriptions prepared before advertising or inter-
viewing applicants for the job; (iii) the amount of time spent on
the job performing the function; (iv) the consequences of not
requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) the work experience of
past incumbents in the job; and (vii) the current work experi-
ence of incumbents in similar jobs.10 2
4. Safety
An employer need not reasonably accommodate an applicant
or employee if doing so would pose a "direct threat"'0 3 to the
health or safety of "other individuals '""°4 in the workplace.
ability to read is an essential function of that job. See 29 C.F.R. app.
§ 1630.2(n) (1992).
102 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(vii) (1992).
103 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (Supp. II 1991). EEOC regulations define a "direct
threat" as a "significant risk of substantial harm" and require a case-by-case
determination of whether an individual poses a "direct threat." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(r) (1992). Employers must consider the following four factors: (1) the
duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the
likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the
potential harm. Id.
104 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1992) The statutory language seems to preclude
a paternalistic employer from refusing to hire an applicant with a disability
for what the employer perceives to be the applicant's own good. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(5) (Supp. II 1991) (citing "overprotective rules and policies" as an
obstacle to be overcome); Cooper, supra note 28 at 1448 n.146.
The EEOC Regulations, on the other hand, would allow an employer to
reject such an applicant:
An employer is also permitted to require that an individual not pose
a direct threat of harm to his or her own safety or health. If
performing the particular functions of a job would result in a high
probability of substantial harm to the individual, the employer
could reject or discharge the individual unless a reasonable accom-
modation that would not cause an undue hardship would avert the
harm.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (1992).
One would assume that the phrase "other individuals" includes customers
and passers-by as well as fellow employees.
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III. DISCRIMINATION THROUGH THE USE OF
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
The ADA prohibits participation in a contractual or other
arrangement that subjects a covered entity's qualified, but
disabled, applicants or employees to discrimination." 5 The
ADA includes the employer-union relationship within this
stricture.0 6 EEOC regulations repeat the prohibition, adding
that it applies regardless of whether the employer intended for
the contractual relationship to have the discriminatory
effect.'0 7 The Report of the House Committee on Education
and Labor states explicitly that an employer cannot use a
collective bargaining agreement to accomplish what the Act
prohibits the employer from doing directly, and cites as an
example of violative behavior a collective bargaining agreement
containing physical criteria having a disparate impact on indi-
viduals with disabilities.'
Though the ADA clearly imposes a duty upon employers to
avoid discrimination, the Act does not definitively state whether
such a duty extends to unions. However, by including "labor
organization[s]" and 'joint labor-management committee[s]"
within its definition of entities covered by the Act,0 9 promul-
gating the general rule that "[n]o covered entity shall discrimi-
nate.. .,,,n and defining discrimination in terms broad
enough to apply to unions,"' the Act strongly suggests that
the ADA antidiscrimination provisions do apply to unions." 2
105 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. H 1991).
oMId. Cf. General Building Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S.
375 (1982) (holding that an employer cannot be held vicariously liable for the
discriminatory conduct of a union or a joint union-trade association commit-
tee).
107 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6 (1992).
108 H. R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 63 (1990). An
employer's requirement that all employees, regardless of job duty, have a
driver's license is an example of a uniformly applied criterion that screens out
individuals who have a disability which makes it impossible for them to obtain
a license (e.g. blind individuals). 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15 (b) & (c) (1992).
109 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (Supp. HI 1990).
11 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. H 1990).
1 See supra note 61.
1 Joanne Jocha Ervin, Reasonable Accommodation and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
1991 DET. C. L. REv. 925, 956-58 (discussing the applicability to unions of
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A contrary conclusion would hold employers liable in situations
where they were unable to accommodate disabled employees
because of union opposition." 3
IV. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS AND
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
While dismissing the notion that a collective bargaining
agreement allows an employer to discriminate in a way other-
wise prohibited by the Act, the Report of the House Committee
on Education and Labor states that a collective bargaining
agreement "could be relevant" in determining whether a given
accommodation is reasonable." 4  This section analyzes the
impact of the reasonable accommodation requirement on col-
lective bargaining by examining whether the ADA requires
reassignment in the face of a contrary provision in a collective
bargaining agreement.
One way an employer may reasonably accommodate a
disabled employee is to reassign that employee to an equivalent
vacant position."' Reassignment is a last resort, only permit-
ted when accommodation within the individual's current posi-
both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA).
113 Id. at 958 (arguing that Congress was not likely to have intended such
a result). Unions may argue that Congress intended employers alone to be
liable, thereby shifting to employers the burden of bargaining for the authority
to disregard provisions of a collective bargaining agreement when the
employer's duty to offer reasonable accommodation so requires. For a general
discussion of the distributive effects of allocating duties to bargain, see Paul
Weiler, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 263 (1990); Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Labor Markets, Employment Contracts, and Corporate Change (forthcoming
1992); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 73, 86-120 (1988) (discussing aspects of labor law that allocate
power between labor and management). See also Joyce E. Margulies, Practical
Considerations Regarding the Collective Bargaining Relationship Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act at 49 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 714, 1990) (arguing that an employer may be liable
under the ADA for the discriminatory behavior of union hiring halls).
114 H. R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 63 (1990). This
statement is, on its face, ambiguous. It seems to preclude the application of
per se rules either in favor of the ADA or the collective bargaining agreement,
but provides no guidance as to how, between these two extremes, courts are to
decide concrete cases.
115 See supra note 68.
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tion would pose an undue hardship."' A policy restricting
reassignment may thus dash a disabled employee's last hope of
receiving accommodation.
Job reassignment often conflicts with collective bargaining
agreements, which commonly require the employer to fill vacant
positions according to employee seniority."" An employer may
legitimately argue that the employer cannot reassign a disabled
employee to a vacant position due to the seniority provisions of
a collective bargaining agreement.1 1 8 This scenario exempli-
fies the policy conflict between the industrial pluralist model,
which creates employment rights through collective bargaining,
and the individual employment rights model, which creates
employment rights through statutes such as the ADA.
Three different bodies of law offer insights into whether the
ADA requires reassignment in the face of a contrary collective
bargaining agreement: the legislative history of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, the case law concerning the Rehabilitation
Act, and the case law concerning Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADA
The House Report of the Committee on Education and
Labor states that although an employer cannot use a collective
bargaining agreement to accomplish what the Act would other-
wise prohibit:
[t]he collective bargaining agreement could be rele-
vant.., in determining whether a given accommoda-
tion is reasonable. For example, if a collective bargain-
ing agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with
a given amount of seniority, it may be considered as a
factor in determining whether it is a reasonable ac-
commodation to assign an employee with a disability
... 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1992).
117 See, e.g., Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (discussed
infra at notes 143-145 and accompanying text) (collective bargaining agree-
ment limited access to light duty positions to employees with five or more
years seniority).
"8 See, e.g., the Rehabilitation Act cases cited infra part IV.B.
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without seniority to the job. However, the agreement
would not be determinative on the issue." 9
The ADA's legislative history thus fails to provide definitive
guidance to resolve conflicts between the ADA and collective
bargaining agreements.
The Committee's analysis of an analogous issue may pro-
vide slightly more concrete guidance as to congressional intent.
The duty to provide reasonable accommodation to a disabled
employee by reassigning the employee to a vacant position does
not require the employer to "bump" another employee from a
position to create a vacancy. 120 This arguably means that an
employer would not be required to displace a person entitled to
a vacancy under a collective bargaining agreement. 2 ' By this
analysis, the employee entitled to a position under the collective
bargaining agreement - not a disabled employee who requires
reassignment - would get the coveted position.
B. THE REHABILITATION ACT
Cases examining collective bargaining agreements as
defenses to an employer's duty under the Rehabilitation Act to
reassign employees indicate several distinct approaches to the
issue. These approaches are, to varying degrees, relevant to
interpreting the ADA.
1. Undue Hardship Approach
An employer may argue that reassigning a disabled em-
ployee contrary to a collective bargaining agreement, potentially
triggering a labor conflict, constitutes an undue hardship, thus
exempting the employer from reasonably accommodating the
employee. 22 The employer in Konieczko v. United States Post-
al Serv.1' apparently took this approach. Konieczko, a letter
119 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 63 (1990). The
Senate report contains nearly identical language. S. REP. NO. 116, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1989).
120 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2 at 63 (1990).
121 Margulies, supra note 113, at 50.
" See Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace,
25 U.S.F. L. REV. 169, 244 n.254 (1991); see also infra part IV.B.1.
123 47 M.S.P.R. 509 (1991).
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carrier with coronary artery disease, requested reassignment on
the basis of this handicap to one of three vacant window clerk
positions.'" The Postal Service refused, citing a collective
bargaining agreement which gave preference for such positions
according to seniority." The Merit Systems Protection Board
stated that "where an agency demonstrates that its nondiscrimi-
natory collective bargaining agreement precludes it from reas-
signing an individual with a handicap to another position, such
evidence is sufficient to establish that the reassignment would
place an undue hardship on the agency."126 The Board held,
however, that such analysis was inapplicable to the particular
case. Since the Postal Service's collective bargaining agreement
only established a "preference" for senior employees, it did not
preclude Konieczko's reassignment. 7 The Board thus found
that, by refusing to reassign Konieczko to a vacant window clerk
position, the Postal Service had discriminated against him on
the basis of handicap."
To find undue hardship under either the Rehabilitation
Act 29 or the ADA,13 0 courts must conduct an extensive balanc-
ing test. Although the Konieczko Board concluded that requir-
ing reassignment in the face of a contrary mandate in the
collective bargaining agreement constituted an undue hardship,
the Board did not employ a balancing test. This may indicate
that, despite language indicating the contrary, the Board was
actually applying a per se approach to the issue.' 31 On the
other hand, the Konieczko Board cited several unreported EEOC
decisions 32  establishing that a collective bargaining
agreement that precludes reassignment constitutes an undue
m4 Id. at 511.
1Id. at 514.
126 Id. at 514-515.
127 Id. at 515.
1 Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
o See supra part 1.C.1.
131 For discussion of the per se approach, see infra part IV.B.2.
132 Wiley v. Frank, EEOC Appeal No. 01860672, slip op. at 4 (July 31,
1990); Ferguson v. Frank, EEOC Appeal No. 01873282, slip op. at 7 (May 8,
1990); Byers v. Frank, EEOC Petition No. 03010024, slip op. at 4 (Feb. 7,
1991). All of these decisions are unreported, and all are cited in Konieczko, 47
M.S.P.R. at 515.
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hardship.'33 The EEOC may have conducted the required
balancing test in these decisions; the Konieczko Board may have
simply adopted the EEOC conclusion.
An undue hardship approach is most appropriate in cases
where the union opposes accommodatory reassignments con-
travening the collective bargaining agreement. In such cases,
the employer can point to specific costs which the employer will
incur as a result of accommodating the employee. These costs
may include bargaining concessions made to obtain the union's
acquiescence to reassignments or, if this is not a viable alterna-
tive, labor strife caused by the offending reassignment. In the
Title VII case of Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,"3 the employer
argued that changing a racially discriminatory seniority system,
pursuant to a district court order, would likely precipitate a
costly strike.'35 The Fourth Circuit held that avoiding union
pressure and the costs of a potential strike were not legitimate
business purposes which could override Title VII proscriptions
of adverse racial impact. 3 6 The same conclusion will not nec-
essarily follow in a similar ADA case. Cost is an irrelevant
consideration when ameliorating discrimination based on
race137  or sex,"' but is a major factor in ADA
133 For a contrary conclusion by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, see Coley v. Secretary of the Army,
689 F. Supp. 519, 523 (D. Md. 1987):
In defending any failure to reassign a handicapped employee, the
agency must show that such action would have created an undue
hardship on its operations. The existence of a negotiated collective
bargaining agreement preventing such reassignment is insufficient
to show undue hardship inasmuch as any such provisions of the
agreement is [sic] rendered unlawful and hence inoperative by the
Rehabilitation Act.
134 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971), and
cert. dismissed sub nom, Tobacco Workers International Union v. Robinson,
404 U.S. 1007 (1972).
135 Id. at 799.
136 Id.
.. See, in addition to Lorillard, United States v. N.L. Industries, 479 F.2d
354, 366 (8th Cir. 1973) (rejecting an employer's argument that avoiding the
increased training expense of changing employment practices is a business
purpose that will validate the racially differential effects of an otherwise
unlawful business practice); United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.,
464 F.2d 301, 310 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom United Transp. Union
v. United States, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973), and cert. denied 409 U.S. 1116 (1973)
(requiring an employer to create and implement a costly and extensive
retraining program).
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determinations of undue hardship. '39 Costs to an employer of
either bargaining for a change in the collective bargaining
agreement, or of violating the collective bargaining agreement in
order to accommodate a disabled employee, may pose an undue
hardship on the employer, excusing her from reassigning the
employee.
2. Per Se Approaches
In addition to arguing undue hardship, an employer may
argue that collective bargaining agreements per se "trump" the
ADA, and that the employer is therefore not required to ac-
commodate employees by reassignment. This approach has the
advantage (from the courts' and the employers' points of view)
of not requiring a balancing of factors; if a court adopts this
approach, the employer will always win. Courts construing the
Rehabilitation Act have taken three routes to find that collective
bargaining agreements per se "trump" the Rehabilitation Act.
a. The Employee Is "Not Otherwise Qualified"
The ADA does not require an employer to accommodate a
disabled applicant or employee who, even absent the disability,
is unqualified for the job. 4 ° EEOC regulations define a quali-
fied individual as one who "satisfies the requisite skill, experi-
ence, education, and other job-related requirements of the
employment position such individual holds or desires ....
A disabled employee who lacks the requisite seniority for a job
to which he wishes to be reassigned thus seems to fit squarely
into the "not otherwise qualified" category. However, one could
challenge the use of seniority as a hiring criteria under the ADA
section proscribing the use of "qualification standards, employ-
13 See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S.Ct.
1196, 1209 (1991) ("[Tlhe incremental cost of hiring women cannot justify
discriminating against them.").
'9 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (four of the six factors
courts must consider when making determinations of undue hardship concern
cost or the employer's ability to pay).
40 The general rule against discrimination states, "No covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a) (West Supp. 1990) (emphasis added). See supra text accompanying
notes 94-96.
141 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1992).
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ment tests or other selection criteria that.., tend to screen out
an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with
disabilities unless the standard, test, or other selection crite-
ria... is shown to be job-related... and is consistent with
business necessity.""' 2
Courts construing the Rehabilitation Act, however, have
been reluctant to strike seniority provisions on similar reason-
ing. In Bey v. Bolger,'" for example, an employee challenged
the validity of the five-year seniority requirement established by
the Postal Service's collective bargaining agreement, which
limited disabled employees' access to light duty positions.'"
The court held that the five year minimum requirement was
"reasonably and substantially related" to the employer's purpose
of:
providing a substantial benefit to its employees who are
no longer able to meet the daily physical requirements
of employment status while limiting these positions to
persons with the necessary seniority in order to main-
tain a high level of efficiency and to keep the attendant
costs down."45
Another application of the "not otherwise qualified" ap-
proach appears in Davis v. United States Postal Service.' 6 In
Davis, an arthritic hemophiliac who failed to qualify for an
entry level position claimed that his employer, pursuant to its
duty of reasonable accommodation, should have considered him
for a non-entry level position filled, according to a collective
bargaining agreement, by competitive bidding based on seniori-
ty."47 Rejecting any such duty, the district court held that
sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act do not require an
employer to consider an otherwise unqualified handicapped
individual for a different position as part of the employer's duty
to provide reasonable accommodation.'
142 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. II 1990).
143 540 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
144 Id. at 912.
1
'
4 Id. at 927.
146 675 F. Supp. 225 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
147 Id. at 226-27.
148 Id. at 236.
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The court's holding rested on two independent grounds.
First, the court held that an employer need not consider a
disabled applicant for a position other than that for which the
applicant applies.'49 This is true a fortiori for ADA cases, be-
cause EEOC regulations pertaining to the ADA state that
reassignment is not available for applicants. 5 ' The second
basis for the court's decision in Davis was that an employer is
not required to reassign an applicant or employee who is oth-
erwise unqualified for the job. A person who does not possess
requisite seniority is not otherwise qualified. 5'
"9 Id. at 234-35. The court, discussing Hoffman v. United States Army,
No. 85 C. 6045, 1987 WL 8616 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1987), stated that the
Hoffman Court had cited several district court opinions that had held that the
"position in question" for which the employer must provide reasonable
accommodation "does not refer to other possible positions within the federal
agency ...." The court then held that because the collective bargaining agree-
ment and Postal Service regulations prohibit an applicant from obtaining the
non entry-level position that the plaintiff was seeking, Id. at 234, the plaintiff
was unqualified for that position. Id. at 236. Because the ADA deletes the
"position in question' assignment, this analysis is inapplicable to cases
brought under the ADA. See infra notes 186-188 and accompanying text.
15o 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1992) ("An applicant for a position must be
qualified for, and be able to perform the essential functions of, the position
sought with or without reasonable accommodation.").
'5' Davis, 675 F. Supp. at 236 ('Moreover, the Rehabilitation Act, whether
it be § 504 or § 501, does not mandate that an otherwise unqualified handi-
capped individual for a particular position be considered for a position not
otherwise available.").
However, whether the second prong of the Davis analysis can be applied
outside the context of suits brought against the United States Postal Service
is unclear. EEOC regulations concerning a federal employer's duty to provide
reasonable accommodation to a disabled employee by reassignment state that
"an employee of the United States Postal Service shall not be considered
qualified for any offer of reassignment that would be inconsistent with the
terms of any applicable collective bargaining agreement." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.203(g) (1992). While this provision provides clear guidance in Postal
Service cases, its implications for similar cases involving other federal agencies
are unstated. The EEOC regulation fails to state a general rule concerning
the obligation of non-Postal Service agencies to reassign employees in the face
of a contravening collective bargaining agreement, leaving two possibilities
open. The Postal Service proviso may illustrate a general rule that agencies
are under no obligation to reassign employees; or the regulation may be an
exception to an implicit general rule that agencies are under an obligation to
reassign employees.
In support of this second possibility, Kenneth Allen Greene argues that
although the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated
between a federal union and a federal agency constitute nondiscretionary
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b. The Rehabilitation Act Does Not Require Reassignment
The Rehabilitation Act defines a qualified handicapped
person as one "who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the position in ques-
tion.. .,152 The interpretation of the phrase "position in ques-
tion" has proven problematic. One line of cases interprets the
phrase to refer only to the position involved in the particular
lawsuit. These cases hold that an employer has no duty to offer
a disabled employee reassignment. As an illustration, in Fowler
v. Frank," a postal employee charged that the Postal Service
discriminated against her on the basis of handicap by failing to
transfer her to a position close to her residence." Rejecting
the claimant's petition, the court held that "[n]othing in the
statute or the regulations suggests that a federal employer must
create a new position for, or even reassign, an employee that
has become handicapped."'55  The federal district court in
Carty v. Carlin'56 used the same reasoning. Noting that the
EEOC regulations do "not enumerate reassignment as a re-
quired accommodation," the Carty court held that the employer
was under no duty to reassign an employee to a permanent light
duty position, stating that "[t]here is nothing in the law or
accompanying regulations to suggest that reasonable accom-
modation requires an agency to reassign an employee to another
policy under which the agency must operate, those provisions, like other
regulations or policies, may be changed by statute or other authority. Greene
states that the Rehabilitation Act may preempt relevant provisions of a federal
union's collective bargaining agreement and, criticizing the Postal Service's
ability to avoid reassigning disabled employees, concludes that "It is time for
the federal courts to give effect to the Rehabilitation Act, and cease to allow
the United States Postal Service to opportunistically hold up the union banner
because it is now a means of avoiding lawful accommodation." Kenneth Allen
Greene, Burdens of Proving Handicap Discrimination Using Federal Employ-
ment Discrimination Law: Rational Basis or Undue Burden?, 1989 DET. C.L.
REV. 1053, 1101.
152 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f) (1992) (emphasis added).
15' 702 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
'5 Id. at 145.
1 s Id. at 147.
16 623 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1985).
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position."'57 Several other courts have reached the same con-
clusion.' 58
Courts are far from unanimous in holding that an employer
has no duty under the Rehabilitation Act to offer a disabled
employee reassignment. Ignacio v. United States Postal Ser-
vice 59 illustrates vividly the judicial and administrative confu-
sion over the conflicts between the Rehabilitation Act and
collective bargaining agreements. The Postal Service fired
Ignacio upon determining that he was unfit for duty as a letter
carrier due to a leg injury."6 At his initial hearing, the pre-
siding official found Ignacio's discharge to be handicap discrimi-
nation because of the Postal Service's refusal to consider reas-
signing Ignacio to a clerk position. 1 ' The Postal Service ap-
pealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The
Board reversed, holding first that an employer's duty to provide
reasonable accommodation to an employee does not require
reassignment; and second that the reassignment would have violat-
ed the Postal Service's collective bargaining agreement.'62
Ignacio then appealed to the EEOC, which reversed the
MSPB, holding first that an employer's duty to provide rea-
sonable accommodation to an employee requires reassignment;
and second that the Rehabilitation Act takes precedence over
any contrary terms in a collective bargaining agreement. 63
On remand,' the MSPB agreed that the Rehabilitation Act
overrules the contrary terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, but also reiterated its earlier position that reasonable accommo-
dation does not require reassignment." Finally, the MSPB
157 Id. at 1189.
" See, e.g., Alderson v. Postmaster General of the United States, 598 F.
Supp. 49, 55 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (the job restructuring requirement of EEOC
regulations does not require assignment to a different job); Dancy v. Kline &
Davia, No. 84-C-7369, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 380, 384 (N.D. Ill.
1987) ("position in question" refers to the position which is the subject of the
lawsuit; "reasonable accommodation" refers to making the job for which the
handicapped person was hired, not another job, accessible).
"9 30 M.S.P.R. 471 (Spec. Pan. 1986).
16o Id. at 474.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 474-75.
163 Id. at 475.
164 Id.
165 Id.
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certified the case to the Special Panel, which adopted in whole
the decision of the EEOC, i.e., that an employer's duty to pro-
vide reasonable accommodation to an employee requires consid-
eration of reassignment to a vacant position and that the Reha-
bilitation Act overrules any contrary terms in a collective
bargaining agreement." Ignacio thus illustrates the strand
of cases requiring employers to offer reassignment to disabled
employees. 67
c. The Rehabilitation Act Requires Reassignment, But a
Collective Bargaining Agreement Prohibiting Such
Reassignment Per Se Vitiates an Employer's Duty to
Reassign
Ignacio represents the minority view that the Rehabilitation
Act takes precedence over any contrary terms in a collective
bargaining agreement." The majority of cases have held
that, even assuming that the Rehabilitation Act requires reas-
signment, an employer has no duty to reassign a disabled
employee, if such reassignment would violate the provisions of
a collective bargaining agreement. Shea v. Tisch is illustrative
of these cases.'69 In Shea, a Vietnam veteran, employed by
the United States Postal Service and suffering from anxiety
disorder, sought reassignment to a post office within ten to
fifteen miles of his residence.7 0 The Postal Service accommo-
dated him by giving him both a temporary reassignment to a
nearby post office and an opportunity to bid on positions as they
became available, using seniority as required by the collective
bargaining agreement. However, the only positions near Shea's
home which became available were for late shifts or for split
16 Id. at 485.
167 See also Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 397 (8th Cir. 1989) (remand-
ing a § 501 decision for factual findings concerning the possibility of transfer-
ring plaintiff to another facility where physical accommodations were possi-
ble); Coley v. Secretary of the Army, 689 F. Supp. 519, 522 (D. Md. 1987)
(where Federal Personnel Manual clearly articulated a policy to reassign
disabled employees, "position in question" includes "all positions to which a
handicapped person might be assigned.").
1 Ignacio, 30 M.S.P.R. at 475.
169 870 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1989).
"
0Id. at 787.
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time off arrangements.'71 Shea refused to bid on these posi-
tions because he claimed they would exacerbate his medical
condition.'72 Thus, when Shea's temporary reassignment ex-
pired without Shea having bid on any assignments, the Postal
Service assigned him to a post office more than fifteen miles
from his home.'73 Shea refused to report for work, so the
Postal Service fired him.7 Shea sued, claiming that the Post-
al Service, as part of its duty to provide reasonable accommoda-
tion to him, was required to assign him to a preferred post office
instead of merely accommodating him within the established
bidding procedure for new jobs. 75 The First Circuit disagreed,
holding that an employer was "not required to accommodate
plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to
do so would violate the [seniority] rights of other employees
under the collective bargaining agreement."' 76
Similarly, in Carter v. Tisch,77 an employee with asthma
requested reassignment from a job as custodian to a permanent
light duty position. 178 A collective bargaining agreement, how-
ever, reserved permanent light duty assignments for employees
with five or more years seniority; Carter had but two and
one-half."' The Fourth Circuit held that the employer's duty
to accommodate by reassigning Carter, if such a duty existed,
"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the
effect or the intent of discrimination.""
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 786-90.
17"'Id. at 790.
177 822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987).
178 Id. at 466.
179 Id.
"DId. at 469. For other cases reaching the same conclusion, see Carty v.
Carlin, 623 F. Supp. at 1189 ("If the plaintiff were automatically reassigned to
another department, this would eliminate his need to compete with other
qualified employees. Such a reassignment might also violate other employees'
rights secured by the collective bargaining agreement between the Postal
Service and the unions."); Daubert v. United States Postal Service, 733 F.2d
1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1984) (employer not required to transfer plaintiff to light
duty job because "union contract provisions barred this alternative").
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3. ADA Distinguished from the Rehabilitation Act
By refusing to recognize an employer's duty under the
Rehabilitation Act to reassign a disabled employee, many courts
never reach the issue of whether a collective bargaining agree-
ment limits an employer's duty to provide reasonable accommo-
dation to the disabled employee. 181 When courts do recognize
such a duty, they usually find that the collective bargaining
agreement "trumps" that duty.82 Therefore, if courts look
solely to cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act to interpret
the ADA, they are likely to conclude, based on one of two ratio-
nales, that an employer is per se not required to provide reason-
able accommodation to a disabled employee by reassignment.
They will likely conclude either that reassignment is not re-
quired at all, or that the duty is vitiated by the existence of
contrary provisions in a valid collective bargaining agreement.
While similar to and modeled on the Rehabilitation Act,
the Americans with Disabilities Act differs in many important
respects. The ADA may compel compliance with its provisions
despite contrary duties established by a collective bargaining
agreement. First, the ADA, as noted in Part III supra, pro-
scribes discrimination through the use of contractual relations.
The collective bargaining agreements relevant in Shea and
Carter constitute this type of discrimination. The Shea and
Carter collective bargaining agreements, restricting access to
light duty work to employees with a certain amount of seniority,
would adversely impact disabled employees, and hence should
violate the ADA.
In Department of Fair Employment and Hous. v. Bay Area
Rapid Transit Dist.,"a the claimant wanted reassignment to
a light duty position to accommodate his injured back, but he
lacked the seniority required by the collective bargaining agree-
ment for such a position. The Federal Employment and Hous-
ing Commission cited a provision of the Fair Employment
Practice Act ("FEPA") proviso (the language of which closely
tracks the ADA) directing that "an employer cannot achieve
... See, e.g., Fowler v. Frank and Carty v. Carlin, discussed supra accompa-
nying text at notes 151-158.
182 See, e.g., Shea v. Tisch and Carter v. Tisch, discussed supra at notes
169-180 and accompanying text.
183 FEHC Decision No. 80-21, Case No. FEP 77-78 A4-1930ph N-13650
80-21 (July 16, 1980).
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indirectly, or via a collective bargaining agreement, that which
it is unlawful to do directly.""' Based on this language, the
Commission held that the collective bargaining agreement
provision restricting light duty positions to senior individuals
violated the FEPA proviso. Further, the Commission concluded
that "where as here, such policy would have the effect of sub-
jecting qualified handicapped persons to unlawful discrimination
on the basis of handicap, it [the collective bargaining agree-
ment] is no defense to liability,""
Second, the ADA definition of a "qualified individual with a
disability" differs sharply from the definition provided by the
Rehabilitation Act. The ADA defines "qualified person with a
disability" as an "individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires." '188 Regulations to section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, on the other hand, define "qualified" in the context of the
"position in question."'"" The ADA change thus eliminates the
inference that only the current job may be considered."
Third, the ADA adds the term "reassignment" to the list of
possible accommodations to be offered to disabled employ-
ees.'89 Rehabilitation Act cases such as Fowler and Carty,
which held that employers have no duty to offer reassignment,
are thus inapplicable to ADA cases.
Fourth, the legislative history of the ADA states that terms
in collective bargaining agreements are "relevant" to and "a
factor" in determining whether an employer is required to offer
reassignment to disabled employees. Though not dispositive,
this language at least precludes conclusions, as per Shea and
Carter, that collective bargaining agreement provisions per se
override the ADA.
18 4 Id.
185 Id.
18 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (West Supp. 1990).
17 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f) (1992).
18 See Arlene Mayerson, Title I - Employment Provisions of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 499, 515 (1991).
1'9 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (Supp. 1 1990).
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C. TITLE VII
Title VII is relevant to the question of whether the ADA
permits a collective bargaining agreement to be a defense to an
employer's duty to provide reasonable accommodation to a
disabled applicant or employee in two contexts. The first
involves remedying past discrimination under terms of a col-
lective bargaining agreement, and typically involves an appli-
cant or employee who argues that the remedy should include
benefits established by the collective bargaining agreement,
such as promotions or seniority, that the applicant or employee
would have obtained but for the discrimination. Remedying
past discrimination does not necessarily create a conflict be-
tween collective bargaining agreements and substantive rights.
The second context arises when either a substantive right, or
the process of obtaining that right, directly conflicts with a
collective bargaining agreement, and typically involves an
applicant or employee who challenges the legality of a seniority
system established by a collective bargaining agreement.
1. Remedying Past Discrimination
Courts are usually quite generous in awarding remedies for
past discrimination. Courts must strive to grant "the most
complete relief possible" for a Title VII violation, 9 ° and must
make the victim "whole" by placing him, "as near as may be, in
the situation he would have occupied if the wrong had not been
committed."'' In Lander v. Lujan,"9 ' the D.C. Circuit held
that an employer must displace ("bump") an innocent incumbent
worker in order to reinstate an employee who had been dis-
charged in violation of Title VII. Similarly, in Franks v. Bow-
man, ' the Supreme Court held that retroactive seniority may
be awarded as relief from an employer's discriminatory hiring
190 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976).
191 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975) (quoting
Wicker v. Happock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867)).
192 888 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See contra Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool, 717
F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that the district court abused its authority in
requiring bumping).
193 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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and assignment policies even if the collective bargaining agree-
ment itself makes no provision for such relief."9
Direct challenges to the validity of seniority systems are
less likely to succeed, as illustrated in California Brewers Ass'n
v. Bryant.195 The collective bargaining agreement at issue in
Bryant created two parallel career ladders, one for permanent
employees (those who worked at least forty-five weeks in one
calendar year) and one for temporary employees (those who
worked fewer than forty-five weeks in one calendar year).'96
Bryant, an African-American, brought a class action alleging
that the forty-five week requirement perpetuated discrimination
by precluding him and members of his class from a reasonable
opportunity of achieving permanent status, as the employer
always fired African-Americans a few days before they complet-
ed forty-five weeks of work in any one year.
Statutes and judicial construction exempt bona fide se-
niority systems from Title VII prohibitions of disparate impact,
even if the seniority systems perpetuate pre-Title VII discrimi-
nation."' As such, Bryant's ability to recover turned on wheth-
er the forty-five week rule was a bona fide seniority system.'
The Court held that the rule focused on the length of employ-
ment and, as such, constituted a valid provision of a permissible
seniority system.'99 Explaining the need to allow a broad
range of seniority systems, the Court stated:
[C]ongress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against
the backdrop of this Nation's longstanding labor policy
of leaving to the chosen representatives of employers
and employees the freedom through collective bargain-
ing to establish conditions of employment applicable to
a particular business or industrial environment. It
194 Id. at 778-79.
'95 444 U.S. 598 (1980).
"
6r Id. at 602-03.
197 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
352 (1977), construing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h) (1988).
198 California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. at 601. This was the only
issue before the Supreme Court. Id.
'99 Id. at 606.
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does not behoove a court to second-guess either that
process or its products.2"
This broad policy of allowing collective bargaining agree-
ments to displace Title VII rights is based solely on the explicit
statutory exemption created by section 703(h)Y. Since the
ADA contains no comparable exemption, disabled claimants will
have a greater opportunity to challenge discriminatory seniority
systems. °2
Like Title VII claimants, victims of disability discrimination
will seek - and will likely receive - "make-whole" remedies
such as retroactive seniority. The framework of rights and
responsibilities created by the collective bargaining agreement
accommodates such a remedy by placing a discriminated-against
person where that person would have been but for the discrimi-
nation. In fact, the collective bargaining agreement may guide
courts in determining the appropriate remedy. Such remedial
action will not necessarily provoke union opposition. The
United States Supreme Court, in the Title VII case of Interna-
200 Id. at 608 (citation omitted).
201 "There can be no doubt, for instance, that a threshold requirement for
entering a seniority track that took the form of an educational prerequisite
would not be part of a 'seniority system' within the intendment of § 703 (h)."
Id. at 609. Despite the court's lofty industrial pluralist rhetoric, and excluding
the 703(h) exemption, Title VII appears to override contrary provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 778 (1976) ("[E]mployee expectations arising from a seniority system
agreement may be modified by statutes furthering a strong public policy
interest."); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 696 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1982) (employer
must make reasonable accommodation of employee's religious beliefs even at
the expense of violating a collective bargaining agreement); Kendall v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 1380 (N.D. IM. 1980) (same); Nottelson v. Smith
Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1046 (1981) ("[A] collective bargaining agreement.., does not of itself provide
a defense for Title VII violations."). But see United Steelworkers of America
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (an affirmative action-based racial quota for
admission to training programs, collectively bargained-for by an employer and
a union, does not violate Title VII); Pinsker v. Joint Dist. 28J, 735 F.2d 388
(10th Cir. 1984) (employer need not accommodate religious needs by violating
leave policy established by collective bargaining).
202 See Ervin, supra note 112, at 960-62 (arguing that Congress presumably
knew, when drafting the ADA, of the 703(h) exemption in Title VII, and
therefore must have intended different treatment for the operation of seniority
systems under the ADA).
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tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,0 3 pointed
out that "[i]ndeed, the union asserts that under its collective
bargaining agreements the union will itself take up the cause of
the post-Act victim and attempt, through grievance procedures,
to gain for him full 'make whole' relief, including appropriate
seniority.''2°  Often, however, unions will oppose remedial
measures. Their duty to represent incumbent members, partic-
ularly against a large class of persons seeking entry into the
field (e.g., the disabled), may provide a disincentive for unions to
carry forcefully the banner of antidiscrimination. 2 5  Despite
potential union hesitancy to support remedies such as retroac-
tive seniority and "bumping" innocent incumbents, these reme-
dies nonetheless fit within the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, and hence pose no direct conflict between the stat-
ute and the agreement.
2. Conflicts Between Substantive Rights and Collective
Bargaining Agreements
The hard cases under individual rights statutes arise when
a disabled individual requests an accommodation that falls
entirely outside the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
The disabled individual who asks for reassignment to a position
for which the individual does not possess the requisite seniority
203 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
2o4Id. at 346.
o5 See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974)
("[Hiarmony of interest between the union and the individual employee cannot
always be presumed, especially where a claim of racial discrimination is
made."); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 749-50
(1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting the "long history of union discrimina-
tion" against minorities and women); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323
U.S. 192 (1944) (union-negotiated collective bargaining agreement which
provided that "not more than 50% of the firemen... shall be Negroes" struck
as violating the Railway Labor Act).
Employees who do not receive favorable treatment from their union do
have the option of suing the union for a breach of the union's duty of fair
representation, Ford Motor Co. v. Huffinan, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). Courts,
however, give broad deference to unions in such cases. Air Line Pilots Ass'n,
Int'l v. O'Neill, 111 S.Ct. 1127, 1135 (1991). As Joanne Ervin points out,
because of this deference, a union which acquiesces to an employer's desire to
reassign a disabled employee is unlikely to be found to violate its duty to fairly
represent its constituents unless it merely rubber-stamps each employer
request. See generally Ervin, supra note 112, at 967-69.
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wants more than retroactive seniority to compensate for an
unjust discharge or a refusal to hire; the individual wants to
bypass the seniority system altogether. A Title VII remedy
restores a discriminated-against person to that person's rightful
position but for the discrimination. It does not make that
person better off than he or she would have been absent the
discrimination. Disability, however, arguably creates a differ-
ence, which may justify differential (preferential) treatment.Y
This preferential treatment will likely violate the terms of
existing collective bargaining agreements.
The closest analogy to this issue in Title VII law arises
under an employer's duty to provide reasonable accommodation
to employees whose religious beliefs conflict with their work
duties.20 7  In Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,20 8
Hardison's religious beliefs prohibited him from working on
Saturdays, but he did not possess sufficient seniority to bid for
a shift with Saturdays off.209 After being discharged for refus-
ing to work, Hardison brought an action for injunctive relief
against his employer claiming that his discharge constituted
religious discrimination in violation of Title VII.21° The Su-
preme Court held that an employer's obligation reasonably to
As discussed supra text accompanying notes 115-116, accommodation
by reassignment is a last resort, and will only be permitted when accommoda-
tion within the disabled individual's current position would pose an undue
hardship. Therefore, if reassignment is not available, the individual will
almost certainly not receive any accommodation at all. The policy issue is
thus transformed into whether the law should make disabled individuals
better off (via reassignment to a preferential position) than they would have
been absent their disability, or whether the law should make them worse off
(i.e., not require accommodation). Title VII, by awarding reinstatement and
damages (see supra text accompanying notes 190-194) treads a middle ground
by (ostensibly) making the victim of discrimination "whole." This is, as
discussed supra, impossible for disability discrimination.
2" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988). At least one district court has held this
duty is an unconstitutional governmental intrusion into religion. Isaac v.
Butler's Shoe Corp., 511 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
208 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977).
209 Id. at 68.
210 Id. at 69.
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accommodate religious objectors does not require departure from
a collectively bargained seniority system:211
[N]either a collective bargaining contract nor a senior-
ity system may be employed to violate the statute, but
we do not believe that the duty to accommodate re-
quires TWA to take steps inconsistent with the other-
wise valid agreement. Collective bargaining... lies at
the core of our national labor policy .... Without a
clear and express indication from Congress, we cannot
agree... that an agreed-upon seniority system must
give way when necessary to accommodate religious
observances.2
In balancing the industrial pluralist labor policy as em-
bodied in the National Labor Relations Act213 against the Title
VII policy against religious discrimination, the Court concluded
that employers had no obligation to accommodate workers'
religious beliefs if doing so would impose more than a de mini-
miS cost.
2 14
Nonetheless, Hardison does not apply to the ADA. The
report of the House Commission on Education and Labor ex-
pressly rejects the application of the de minimis approach to
reasonable accommodation under the ADA; it instead states
that the ADA imposes a "significantly higher" standard than
that articulated in Hardison."5 The precise contours of this
standard are unclear. Neither the Ace 6 and its legislative
history,217 nor the EEOC regulations, 218 give any firm indi-
cation as to how a similar balancing test would be resolved
under the ADA.219
211 Id. at 81.
212 Id. at 79 (footnote omitted).
213 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
214 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84.
215 See supra note 67.
216 See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 67, 79, 85, 87 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 21, 83, 84 and accompanying text.
219 See, e.g., R. Bales, Libertarianism, Environmentalism, and Utilitari-
anism: An Examination of Theoretical Frameworks for Enforcing Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, (draft copy on file with the Cornell Law and
Public Policy Journal):
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Title VII cases involving racial discrimination - cases
which require employers to show far more than de minimis cost
to justify discrimination220 - may provide some guidance. In
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Community Org.,22' a un-
ion, after investigating complaints of racial discrimination,
invoked the collective bargaining agreement grievance proce-
dure by demanding the convening of a joint union-management
Adjustment Board.222 Several employees found the procedure
inadequate and refused to participate. Against the union's
advice, these employees picketed the employer's store, for which
they were fired.2" The NLRB found that the employer prop-
erly discharged the employees for attempting to bargain with
the company over the terms and conditions of employment.2 4
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, concluding
that concerted activity directed against racial discrimination
enjoys a "unique status" under the NLRA and Title VII;225
that the NLRB "should inquire.., whether the union was
actually remedying the discrimination to the fullest extent
possible, by the most expedient and efficacious means; '2 6 and
that "[wihere the union's efforts fall short of this high standard,
[The six-factor balancing test, as discussed supra at notes 76-92,]
provide[s] no constructive guidance to courts faced with concrete
cases, and will create the same indeterminacy that currently
plagues section 504 cases. A legal approach telling judges to
examine all the facts and balance them avoids formulating a rule of
decision. People are entitled to know the legal rules before they act,
yet under the standards articulated by Congress, no one can know
where she stands until litigation has been completed and the last
appeal rejected. Such indeterminacy breeds litigation that a
bright-line test, such as the proposal to impose a ceiling of ten
percent of an employee's annual salary as the upper limit for what
an employer must do to reasonably accommodate the employee,
would avoid. Litigation imposes stiff costs and high risks on both
parties in a potential lawsuit, costs and risks which disabled per-
sons are disproportionately unable to bear. Indeterminacy may be
good business for employment litigators, but it is bad law.
Id.
220 See supra note 137.
221 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
222 Id. at 54.
223 Id. at 55-56.
224 Id. at 57.
2' Id. at 58-59.
22 6 Id. at 59-60.
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the minority group's concerted activities cannot lose its section
7 protection."M  Reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme
Court held that minority employees may not engage in concert-
ed activity to alter an employer's racial policies in derogation of
the union's role as exclusive bargaining representative. The
Court stated that a substantive right conferred by Title VII to
be free of racial discrimination "cannot be pursued at the ex-
pense of the orderly collective-bargaining process contemplated
by the NLRA.21
Like disabled employees seeking light duty positions for
which they do not possess the requisite seniority, the Emporium
Capwell plaintiffs tried to bypass the established collective
bargaining process altogether. The Supreme Court refused to
permit action proscribed by the collective bargaining agree-
ment.229 Though this decision would appear to bode badly for
disabled claimants, the two situations may be readily distin-
guished. The Emporium Capwell plaintiffs had available, but
rejected, the option of pursuing their grievances through mecha-
nisms established by the collective bargaining process. 30
They could have filed individual grievances, acceded to the
union's submission of the issue to the Adjustment Board, or
filed Title VII claims. If the plaintiffs had pursued any of these
options, their Title VII rights would not have conflicted with the
collective bargaining agreement. Disabled employees, however,
have no alternative options which would avoid the conflict; by
the terms of the EEOC regulations, reassignment is to be used
only as a last resort."i Because the options noted above are
not available to disabled employees, courts should not prohibit
them from seeking a remedy which is contrary to collective
bargaining agreement provisions. Emporium Capwell's strong
industrial pluralist stance should not preclude the reassignment
of a disabled employee contrary to a collective bargaining agree-
ment.
I Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 931 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 69.
Id. at 66-70.
230 Id.
"' See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text. Further, the first two
of the three listed options (filing grievances or submitting the issue to an
Adjustment Board) are only available if the employees are unionized.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The ADA prohibits the discriminatory use of contractual
relations,212 but simultaneously permits the use of a collective
bargaining agreement as a defense to reasonable accommoda-
tion.233  The EEOC has provided no significant guidance to
reconcile these provisions,2" leaving the problem to the courts.
Neither the legislative history of the ADA nor the case
histories of the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII provide defini-
tive guidance to resolve conflicts between the individual em-
ployment rights created by the ADA and the collective rights
created by collective bargaining agreements. The House Report
of the Committee on Education and Labor stated that the
existence of a collective bargaining agreement is "relevant" to
and constitutes "a factor" in determining whether an accom-
modation is reasonable. Such statements are virtually mean-
ingless; 2 5 EEOC silence provides even less guidance.23 6 The
"undue hardship" approach under the Rehabilitation Act ap-
pears superficially to provide a cogent defense for employers
who wish to avoid a duty to reassign disabled employees, but it
rests on one ambiguous and several unreported (and inaccessi-
231ble) agency decisions. Several cases have adopted per se
rules to resolve conflicts between collective bargaining agree-
ments and the Rehabilitation Act, but since the reported cases
reach contradictory results, they too offer little guidance.233
Title VII promises generous remedies to victims of discrimina-
tion,239 but since Title VII remedies seldom conflict with col-
lectively bargained rights, the majority of cases are inapplica-
ble.24° Congress declared the standard established by the one
Title VII case seemingly on point to be inapplicable to the
ADA,241 but declined to offer an alternative standard.
22 See supra part III.
See supra part IV.
4 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
See supra part IV.B.1.
See supra part IV.B.2.
2' See supra text accompanying notes 190-202.
o See supra test accompanying notes 203-205.
24 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
TITE I OF THE ADA
There is therefore no clear answer in the law as to whether
the ADA provides disabled employees with the right to job
reassignment if such reassignment conflicts with the provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement. Courts faced with this
issue must choose whether to give priority to the provisions of
an individual rights statute or to the terms of a collectively
bargained-for agreement.
Courts should interpret the ADA to require reassignment in
the face of contrary provisions in collective bargaining
agreements. Reassignment is the last hope of disabled em-
ployees who otherwise will not be accommodated and will
therefore be deprived of employment opportunities.242 In some
circumstances, the only way to accommodate them may be to
assign them to a job which they are able to perform, even if they
do not possess the seniority mandated by a collective bargaining
agreement. Courts should therefore interpret the ADA to
impose upon employers a duty to provide reasonable accommo-
dation to disabled employees by reassigning them when neces-
sary to a different position, even if such reassignment contra-
venes a collective bargaining agreement. Such an interpretation
imposes few significant impediments upon the exercise of
collectively bargained-for rights; it merely removes from the
field of negotiable issues the question of whether collective
bargaining provisions which prohibit reassignment may perpet-
uate discrimination against disabled individuals. Disability
discrimination, like race and sex discrimination, should be
non-negotiable. The alternative is to ensure the perpetuation of
such discrimination by permitting unions, through their insis-
tence on the retention of discriminatory provisions in collective
bargaining agreements which prohibit reassignment, to control
the scope, direction, pace, and degree of disability discrimina-
tion.
R. Balest
2 See supra notes 115-116.
t Candidate for J.D., 1993. Special thanks to Thelma Crivens and to
Katherine Van Wezel Stone.
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